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ABSTRACT 
Peterson, Erica Kay; M.S.; Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics; 
College of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources; North Dakota State 
University; April 2007. An Econometric Analysis of Cost Changes in U.S. Trucking 
and the Implications of Implementing the NAFTA Trucking Provisions. Major 
Professor: Dr. Siew Hoon Lim. 
The United States trucking industry underwent deregulation starting in 1980. 
There was much opposition to the process in fears that trucking companies would be 
adversely affected by increased competition. There were also many proponents and 
researchers who proved that the increased competition due to regulatory reform only 
helped strengthen the industry by forcing firms to become more cost efficient. 
There has been similar opposition and support for the trucking provisions of 
NAFT A. Although the provisions have not been fully implemented, the trucking 
industry is well aware it will only be a matter of time. In early 2002 it was announced 
that the process to begin implementing the trucking provisions would begin in mid-
2002. Many in the industry and other groups have opposed implementing the 
provisions, concerned that U.S. trucking firms would be subject to competition from 
Mexican firms, just as they feared trucking firms would be adversely affected by 
deregulation more than 25 years ago. 
This thesis analyzes the effects the 2002 announcement of the process to begin 
implementing the trucking provisions has had on the cost structure of the industry. It 
uses a translog cost function to determine if firms have become more efficient in the 
years following the announcement in anticipation of increased competition from 
Mexican firms after the provisions are fully implemented. The translog cost function 
Ill 
is used to determine what effects the NAFT A variable has had on costs and what 
specific operating characteristics have caused the costs to increase or decrease. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Introduction 
The United States trucking industry has been impacted by many different factors 
over the last century. Changes in policy and regulations within the industry have had 
many effects on trucking firms, including changes in costs (wages, fuel, insurance, 
etc.), rates charged to customers, efficiency, and the general structure of the trucking 
industry, over the last 30 years. The most important change has been the process of 
regulation and the subsequent deregulation. 
Regulation was brought about by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Many workers 
in the transportation industry lived in poverty and suffered poor working conditions. 
Wages tended to be low, and workers received little or no benefits; also, rates were 
unstable; services were often unreliable; and there was a high worker turnover rate. It 
was thought that regulation could rectify the situation by gaining more bargaining 
power for higher, more stable wages. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
took control of regulation following the Motor Carrier Act (Henrickson 2004 ). Under 
this government control, strict rules were imposed on trucking companies to insure 
safety and prevent the negative effects of unregulated competition; rates were set; and 
entry into the industry by new firms was limited (Hircsh 1993). Following the 
enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (!BT) was formed as the official union of the trucking industry (Peoples 
1998). 
Opponents of regulation claimed that the unionized and regulated trucking 
industry severely decreased competition and created a system of inefficient and 
inflationary union bargaining power (Ying 1990b ). Many market economists blamed 
overall inflation, in part, on trucking and other regulated industries. On that basis, 
many urged Congress and the White House to deregulate many industries, including 
the trucking, airline, utilities, and telecommunications industries. The process of 
deregulation began in the late I 970's. 
By 1977, the ICC began to let carriers work competitively as both common and 
contract carriers. New companies entering the industry no longer needed to prove 
they were necessary. By 1994, companies no longer had to file shipping rates and in 
1996, the Interstate Commerce Commission was abolished. Drivers and trucking 
companies now found themselves in a competitive market (Tang and Ma 2002). 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 made the process of deregulation official. 
Thousands of new carriers entered the for-hire industry sector and most were non-
unionized and lower-cost. The new firms that began to take over were more efficient 
and innovative. According to the !BT, membership in trucking unions continued to 
decrease and by the year 2000, only 25 percent of all drivers were represented by a 
union. Deregulation also opened up new routes and introduced new suppliers, third-
party transportation brokers, and freight forwarders (Hirsch 1993, Boyer 1997). 
Problem Statement 
The United States trucking industry has been further impacted in many ways by 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The passage ofNAFTA in 
1993 http://www.bertholdfarmers.com/liberated trade between the United States, 
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Canada and Mexico. Provisions in the treaty stated that the border between the 
United States and Mexico was to be opened to U.S., Canadian, and Mexican trucking 
on December 17, 1995 (U.S. Department of Transportation). Since 1982, U.S. trucks 
have only been able to travel within about 20 miles of the Mexican border and 
Mexican trucks can only go about the same distance into the U.S. This is costly as 
truckers have to transfer goods from one truck to another to cross the border. Thus, 
proponents of the agreement felt these provisions to make crossing the border more 
efficient would benefit the trucking industry. 
Opponents, however, argued against the terms ofNAFTA. They argued that 
Mexican trucks were unsafe and unfit to travel within the United States because 
Mexican trucks didn't have to follow the same safety regulations as U.S. trucking 
companies. Many felt allowing them to travel across the border would compromise 
the safety of U.S. citizens. Many U.S. trucking firms also felt they would be subject 
to unfair competition since Mexican truckers work for lower wages. Many opponents 
argued this could cause U.S. trucker to lose jobs to Mexican truckers. Under this 
pressure the US government delayed the implementation of unlimited trucking access. 
Regulations were kept in place that allowed Mexican trucks within only 20 miles of 
the U.S. border and U.S. trucks within 20 miles of the Mexican border. In February 
of 2001, an arbitration panel ruled that the U.S. ban was in violation ofNAFTA. 
Following the ruling, Congress approved and the President signed legislation detailing 
22 safety requirements that must be met before allowing Mexican trucks to drive 
beyond U.S. commercial zones. In 2002, the U.S. Department of Transportation 
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certified these requirements had been met and announced that the process to begin 
implementing the NAFTA trucking provisions. 
The proposed provisions ofNAFT A would not allow Mexican drivers to carry 
goods between U.S. cities, only from Mexican cities to U.S. cities. However, this still 
creates competition for American drivers. Because Mexican drivers earn less than 20 
percent of what U.S. drivers earn, American trucking companies can operate more 
cheaply using Mexican drivers. As U.S. trucking companies contemplate moving to 
Mexico, U.S. truck drivers may be affected. 
Proponents ofNAFTA claim that U.S. trucking companies will benefit by this 
free trade because it will reduce their costs and make them more efficient, and in 
return, reduce rates charged to their customers. Opponents claim U.S. trucking 
companies will suffer from reduced revenues because of competition from Mexican 
drivers and thus wages will decrease and rates to customers will increase. 
Objectives 
The main objectives of this study are to estimate the economic impacts that the 
announcement in 2002 to begin the process of implementing the trucking provisions 
ofNAFTA has had on the United States trucking industry. The specific objectives 
are to 
I. Determine the effects the NAFT A trucking provision implementation 
announcement has had on costs incurred by the trucking firms. 
2. Determine what specific operating characteristics affect cost change. 
Although there has not been much research done to analyze how trucking firms 
are reacting to the possibility of the trucking provision actually being implemented, 
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there has been a plethora of research done determining the effects deregulation had on 
firm's efficiency. Deregulation was also a monumental change for the trucking 
industry that many opposed for fear that increased competition would put firms out of 
business and lower paid non-union workers would take over jobs of union workers. 
Deregulation cause firms to change and become more efficient and cost saving. Thus, 
the basis of this paper is to determine if trucking firms are reacting to the possibility 
of increased competition in the same way firms reacted to deregulation. 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of literature; 
Chapter 3 outlines the models used for this analysis; Chapter 4 summarizes the Data 
used for the modeling; Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the results of the research; 
and Chapter 6 summarizes the study. 
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CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The United States trucking industry has gone through many changes throughout 
its existence, including regulation; deregulation; and various policies that have 
affected competition and trade. Regulation and deregulation were controversial in the 
fact that the policies affected the union-nonunion wage gap, wages paid to drivers, 
costs, productivity, and efficiency of trucking firms. In recent years, the possible 
implementation of the NAFT A trucking provisions relating to the United States 
trucking industry renewed this controversy. Much debate has spawned, concerning 
the same issues regulatory reform brought about years ago as well as new issues. 
Some controversial issues included effects on drivers' wages, costs incurred by 
trucking firms, and safety concerns. 
This literature review section gives a background of studies done on the effects 
ofregulation and deregulation on driver's wages, union-nonunion density, costs, and 
efficiency. It also gives an overview ofNAFTA and all the issues that go with the 
free trade agreement concerning the trucking industry. 
Regulation of the Trucking Industry 
Before 1935, the motor carrier industry was characterized by poor working 
conditions; rapid worker turnover rates; unstable rates; and unreliable services. 
Because of these factors and pressure and lobbying from the trucking and railroad 
firms; unions; state regulatory commissions; and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was passed (Henrickson 2004). 
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The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 initially provided for regulation of the trucking 
industry and gave the ICC authority to the "for-hire" part of the trucking industry. 
The for-hire sector consists of drivers that define their industry of employment as 
trucking. Certain types of carriers were exempt from the restrictions including private 
carriers, the non-trucking companies that are limited to transporting only their own 
goods, and carriers of unprocessed agricultural products (Peoples 1998). Regulation 
severely restrained many areas of the trucking industry in order to keep competition 
low and prevent the existing trucking firms from being harmed economically (Hirsch 
1993). 
The issue of trucking regulation brought about much controversy related to 
increased profits and rates, and decreased competition and efficiency. Since the 
1950s, economists have done studies indicating that U.S. motor carrier regulation has 
caused inefficiencies and a misallocation ofresources. Reports have indicated that 
shippers have generally paid higher rates than needed and the costs of trucking firms 
have increased because of regulation. There is evidence that regulation caused over 
investment in equipment and impeded innovation, which led to decreased productivity 
growth. Also studies have found that union wage gains were anywhere between 3 7 
percent and 5 5 percent more than competitive wages. Restrictions of regulation 
sometimes prevented carriers from completely filling their trucks, causing them to not 
utilize their capacity. The route restrictions added unnecessary miles to trips which 
added to costs, wasted resources, and slowed deliveries. Some restrictions also meant 
that some carriers returned from their destinations with empty trucks (Ying 1990b ). 
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Rates for trucking companies or owner operators who could be hired to provide 
long-haul service for intercity and interstate carriage service were set. These set rates 
were often higher than the rates before regulation. The rate constraint as well as 
growth in the demand for trucking services and expansion of the United States 
highway system meant higher rents for firms in the trucking industry. The higher 
rents were the result of higher costs and prices than would have existed in a non-
regulated, competitive industry. These higher rents were most often captured by the 
owners in the form of profit and workers in the form of wages (Hirsch 1993). 
Because the setting of detailed freight rates would have been extremely complex, the 
ICC encouraged regulated carriers to establish rate bureaus so that they could engage 
in joint ratemaking. These rate bureaus were exempted from antitrust laws after 
Congress passed the Reed-Bullwinkle Act in 1948. By 1980, there were ten major 
rate bureaus in existence and about 55 smaller rate bureaus (Hirsch 1993). 
Entry into the trucking industry was also severely restricted. The ICC had 
authority to require common carriers to have designated points of origin and 
destination and had control over the routes over which they carried freight, and the 
types of freight. New route certificates were issued only where routes were not 
already being served and if entry would not economically damage existing carriers. 
Therefore, competition was severely limited as very few new trucking firms were 
allowed to enter the regulated sector (Hirsch 1993 ). However, defendants of 
regulation use statistics to argue that the I CC did not restrict entry into the industry. 
They pointed out the fact that the percentage of applications approved rose from 69.8 
percent in 1976 to 99 percent in 1982 and that large numbers of applications were 
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filed each year. Critics argued that the ICC did limit new entry as new carriers were 
required to prove that current carriers were unable or unwilling to provide the service 
under consideration. As most major markets already received service, the new 
carriers had to serve very small, narrowly defined markets in order to enter the market 
(Putsay 1986). 
Regulation that restricts the entry of competitors tends to allow for relative ease 
of unionization because the per-worker cost of organizing employees is low in 
industries consisting of only a few large firms. There is evidence that shows that this 
is what happened in the United States trucking industry after regulation 
(Peoples 1998). 
Restrictions on entry and rate competition provided an opening for union gains 
in the trucking industry. As a result of regulation, membership in the trucking 
industry's union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (!BT), grew 
substantially. The !BT was formed in 1903 as a means of gaining better working 
conditions and wages for the teamsters. Teamsters in 1903 transported goods via 
horse and carriage. The union continued to grow and expand throughout the years 
until the beginning of the Depression. Membership hit an all-time low in 1933 with 
only 75,000 members. After the trucking industry was regulated in 1935, the !BT 
organized a large portion of the trucking industry. Membership grew from 75,000 in 
1935 to 920,000 by 1948. The IBT's presence was most noticeable in intercity 
carriage, where the percentage of truckers belonging to the union grew from almost 
none in 1933 to nearly 80 percent by the mid-l 940s (Peoples 1998 and !BT). The 
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IBT gained power and captured for union drivers a substantial share of industry rents 
(Hirsch 1993 ). 
Regulation of the trucking industry also allowed another goal of the IBT to be 
realized. A long-time goal had been the signing of a national wage agreement to 
remove labor costs from competition among firms. The ICC rate setting restriction 
partially fulfilled this goal. The rate setting restriction allowed increases in wages 
(labor costs) to be largely passed on through rates. In some cases labor costs 
accounted for almost 65 percent of total freight costs. The rate-making through 
bureaus allowed regional and industry-wide wage increases to be passed on to 
shippers. Wage rates were no longer in competition. While trucking firms still had 
incentives to lower costs, the IBT's control of major terminals and their use of 
secondary boycotts until the 1960s allowed them to organize major segments of the 
trucking industry. Their major strength was in the regular route carriers of general 
freight in the less-than-truckload (LTL) sector of the market (Hirsch 1988). 
In 1964 the National Master Freight Agreement was formed which shifted 
bargaining power from the regional to the national level. This allowed the !BT to 
gain national bargaining. However, competition arose in the 1970s partially due to 
natural economic responses to inefficiencies and cost differentials caused by 
regulation, as well as wage increases and increased legal restrictions on 18 T's 
activities and power (Hirsch 1988). As a result of the increased competition, the ICC 
created a Motor Carrier Task Force to study problems with existing motor carrier 
regulations in 1977 (Tang and Ma 2002). In late 1978, the ICC allowed companies 
hauling their own goods to apply for authority to haul for others. They also abolished 
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regulations limiting contract carriers to service no more than eight shippers, expanded 
airport zones which were exempt from regulation, and announced that they would 
consider rates a factor in granting operation rights. By 1980, nonunion trucking firms 
not in the regulated sector had already increased their share of the market (Hirsh 
1988). 
Deregulation of the Trucking Industry 
Deregulation processes began in the late 1970s with some policy changes. 
Policy changes in 1978 led to a record number of applications from new and existing 
trucking firms for routes (Peoples 1998). The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 deregulated 
the interstate trucking industry. The Act permitted free entry into the interstate 
industry and began to allow rate competition. Complete deregulation came about 
through legislations passed in 1982, 1986, 1993, and 1994. In August of 1994, 
congress passed the Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act (TIRRA), which 
eliminated all state oversight of intrastate trucking operations and removed rate filing 
requirements. Rates were now confidential and trucking firms could charge whatever 
they could negotiate with their customers. Also, motor carriers could carry what they 
wished anywhere in the United States (Tang and Ma 2002). 
Deregulation had substantial impacts on the trucking industry. Interstate and 
intrastate deregulation allowed lower-cost and nonunion firms to enter the for-hire 
tucking industry sector. It also opened up new routes and introduced new suppliers, 
third-party transportation brokers, and freight forwarders. Shippers now had a larger 
choice of suppliers to choose from. Deregulation caused the bankruptcy of a majority 
of the twenty largest trucking firms. The process of deregulation also brought about a 
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higher rate of business failure among all trucking companies (Hirsch 1993). New 
firms took over that were more efficient and innovative (Boyer 1997). The entry of 
these new more cost-efficient, nonunion firms had major effects on the trucking 
industry. Some of these effects include: changes in union power and density, changes 
in trucking firms' costs, rates, and wages, and changes in trucking firms' efficiency, 
innovations, and profits. 
Changes in Union Density After Deregulation 
The new firms that entered the industry after deregulation were generally 
nonunionized and focused on cost minimization and efficiency. With the onset of 
price competition, nonunion carriers easily won business because oflower labor costs 
and more competitive rates. The availability of alternative low-cost carriers 
weakened the bargaining power of the !BT. Union density fell sharply following 
deregulation. Sixty-two percent of the for-hire truckers were unionized in 1973, this 
fell to about 30 percent in 1984 and down to 23 percent in 1996 (Engel 1998). 
Various studies have been done to determine the effects on deregulation on 
union density. A study done by Hirsch in 1993 used Current Population Surveys 
(CPS) from the period of 1973-1990 to analyze changes in union density before and 
after regulation. He distinguishes between the for-hire sector ( drivers who designate 
their industry of employment as the trucking service industry) and the private carrier 
sector (those drivers that define something other than trucking as their employment). 
This distinction is made because drivers in the for-hire sector were affected directly 
from deregulation while drivers in the private carrier sector were affected indirectly. 
He found that union density in the previously regulated for-hire sector fell from an 
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average of 60 percent during the regulatory period to about 40 percent by l 985 and 
down to 24 percent by 1990. Union density didn't decrease as much in the private 
carrier sector. Union density was at about 36 percent before regulation, it fell to 30 
percent by 1985, and 25 percent by 1990. His study also found that there was relative 
growth in employment in the for-hire sector after deregulation. This could be 
attributed to the fact that during the regulatory period many companies did their own 
trucking rather than ship their products by regulated, more costly common carriers. 
After deregulation companies shifted to the more competitive for-hire sector. 
Another study by Peoples (1998) summarized previous studies that have 
investigated the effects of deregulation on union density and wages in four sectors: 
trucking, railroad, airline, and telecommunications and compared them to a control 
group of workers in other industries. In this paper, data from 1973 to 1999 is used 
and was taken from Current Population Survey and Hirsch and Macpherson's Union 
Membership and Earnings Data Book. The period of 1978 to 1996 is considered the 
period of deregulation. His analysis shows that union membership in the trucking 
industry fell from 46 percent in 1978 to 23 percent in 1996. The union membership 
pattern is consistent with the notion that the trucking industry has low barriers to 
entry, thus deregulation allowed easy entry for nonunion firms. Union membership in 
the other three sectors also decreased. However, union membership in these four 
sectors is still higher than the national average for other industries. In 1996, only 14 
percent of workers in the other industries belonged to a union. 
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Changes in Wages After Deregulation 
Deregulation also brought about changes in wages in the trucking industry. The 
entry of new nonunion firms allowed more competition and thus lower rates and costs 
for trucking firms. The shift from regulation to deregulation meant shifting from rate 
regulation to competitive pricing. This made it unprofitable for carriers to pass on high 
union wages that are not justified by higher productivity. In the deregulated trucking 
industry, increased emphasis on cost minimization and declining control of the union's 
control over labor supply reduced the likelihood that the truck drivers would receive 
high wages. This effect may not have been limited to just unionized firms as 
nonunionized firms often increased their wages to compete with unionized firms in 
order to avoid workers rallying for membership in the IBT union (Peoples 1998). 
Various economic studies conducted have shown that trucking firm's costs, and thus 
wages have decreased since deregulation of the industry. 1 
Peoples ( 1998) analyzed the effects deregulation had on wages in four 
industries. He states that before deregulation, these four industries had strong unions 
that negotiated high wages for their members. These wages were at least 14 percent 
higher the wages received by workers in other industries. The rate regulations 
allowed by regulations allowed carriers in these industries to past on costs, including 
wages, to their customers which contributed to unionized workers receiving 
high wages. 
Real weekly earnings in the trucking industry fell from $491 in 1978 to $353 in 
1996, after the deregulation process. Earnings in the railroad industry fell from $491 
to $470, earnings in the airline industry fell from $498 to $435, and weekly earnings 
1 These studies include Engel ( 1998), Hircsh ( 1993), and Peoples ( 1998). 
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in the telecommunication industry fell from $488 to $442. Wages in all other 
industries fell from $363 to $334. Trucking earnings fell 28 percent compared to 
earning decreases in any of the other industries which fell from 4 percent to 10 
percent. 
Peoples also investigated what happened to the earnings premium received by 
workers in the trucking industry after deregulation. Past research has indicated that 
for-hire truck drivers received an earnings premium that decreased after deregulation. 
Hirsch and Macpherson ( 1997) analyzed the effects that deregulation had on the union 
wage premium. Prior to deregulation, truck drivers also had an earnings premium 
compared to workers in other highly unionized industries. After deregulation, the 
earnings premium relative to other highly unionized industries disappeared and was 
even negative during some years. A smaller earnings premium relative to workers in 
industries not highly unionized remained. The wage premium for unionized truck 
drivers compared to workers in other industries in 1977-78 was 22 percent, this 
dropped to less than 2 percent by 1995. Management positions earnings premiums 
declined markedly in the trucking industry after deregulation. Before deregulation the 
premium was 13 percent, this fell to a minus 2 percent premium afterwards. 
Management position premiums in the other three highly unionized industries fell 
little. Of the four industries analyzed, the trucking industry experienced the largest 
decline in earnings premium. This indicates that the trucking industry seems to be the 
industry that has moved closest to full competition relative to its counterparts. This 
makes sense considering that the trucking industry has characteristics that satisfy 
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conditions for competition, including: low capital and entry costs to carriers and a 
labor supply that is elastic because workers skills can be acquired quickly. 
A positive side to the declining per worker labor costs is that they are an 
important source of consumer welfare gains. Peoples (1998) calculated worker losses 
by taking the product of the earnings premium changes after deregulation and labor's 
total annual compensation in 1991. He found that worker's losses in current dollars of 
up to $5.7 billion in trucking, $1.2 billion in railroads, $3.4 billion in airlines, and 
$5.1 billion in telecommunications. Once again, the trucking industry saw the biggest 
decline. Peoples refers to a study done by Winston (1985) that calculated annual 
consumer welfare gains from deregulation of $50 billion for a not exactly comparable 
group of industries. This indicates that worker surplus losses represent a large share 
of consumer welfare gains from deregulation. 
Hirsch (1993) analyzed the effects of deregulation on union density and wages. 
Using the CPS data for the years 1973-1990, Hirsch found that average real wage 
rates among union drivers in the for-hire sector declined after deregulation, but have 
shown slow change since the mid-l 980s. Contrary to union truckers' wages, wages 
for nonunion for-hire drivers remained relatively stable during the entire 1973-1990 
period. Union and nonunion workers in the private, unregulated sector saw very little 
change in their wage rates following deregulation. In the previously regulated for-hire 
sector, the union-nonunion wage differential fell from .39 during the regulatory period 
to about .30 after deregulation (in the late 1980s). Hirsch's findings ( 1993) mirror 
those of his 1988 study. Using CPS data from 1973-1985 Hirsch came to the same 
conclusions. He found that hourly earnings for union drivers fell after deregulation 
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while earnings changes for nonunion drivers followed the economy-wide changes 
among nonunion workers. He also concluded that the union-nonunion wage 
differential narrowed, but that the union premium remained large after deregulation. 
Hirsch discovered that truck drivers in the for-hire sector earned about 4 percent more 
than a control group of workers not employed in the trucking industry and drivers in 
the private sector earned about 4 percent less. 
Engel (1998) also did research to analyze the effects that deregulation had on 
wages and union-nonunion wage premiums. She found that during the 1973-1978 
period, real wages for unionized truck drivers averaged $12.45 per hour and fell to 
$11.15 during the 1979-1985 period. However, Engel's research showed that 
nonunionized truck drivers' wages changed very little between the two periods. This 
represents a narrowing of the union-nonunion wage premium. She estimated that the 
premium fell from a little less than 50 percent to 25-30 percent after deregulation. 
Changes in Efficiency and Costs After Deregulation 
More money is spent on trucking than any other form of transportation. Almost 
three times as much money is spent on intercity trucking as on railroad, water, and oil 
pipeline transportation combined. Estimates have calculated that it takes about one 
dollar per mile to drive a standard 18-wheel, 80,000-pound truck. Of this, about 40 
cents go to the driver; 20 cents are spent on fuel; and the rest is spent on other costs, 
including depreciation, licensing, interest, tires, maintenance, and other items. 
Trucking firms pay for the use of highways in the form of fuel taxes. Some have 
argued that this amount is too low and does not compensate for the congestion, 
pollution, and safety problems that trucks cause on the highways, not to mention 
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general wear and tear on the roads. There are also more people employed in the 
trucking industry than in the other transportation industries. In 1994, there were 
roughly 1.84 million employed in the trucking industry; 240,000 in the railroad 
industry; 162,000 in water transport; and just 17,000 in oil pipeline transport (Boyer 
1997). Efficiency and cost minimization are important in any industry; however, the 
sheer size of the trucking industry further exemplifies the need. 
After deregulation, new firms were able to enter the industry. Many of those 
used sophisticated data management techniques to coordinate shipments to attempt to 
eliminate less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments and to ensure return loads. These 
improvements were important because they ensured that trucks were fully loaded and 
moving for as many hours as possible. The new data management tools as well as the 
development of a system of freight brokers helped increase efficiency. The new, 
more efficient firms were generally nonunionized, and the surviving unionized firms 
catered to the less-than-truckload sector (Boyer 1997). Lack of technology is a huge 
factor that causes inefficiencies. Firms may also be inefficient if they simply do not 
minimize costs due to protection of regulation, they face incentives for use of inputs, 
they suffer input biases due to required service levels or restrictions on purchases of 
inputs, or if the industry itself is inefficiently structured (Daughety and Nelson 1988). 
Hubbard ( 1993) analyzed the effects of using such technological advances as 
on-board computers (OBCs) and electronic vehicle management systems (EVMS) in 
trucks. The results indicated that on-board computer use has increased capacity 
utilization significantly. In 1997, EVMS increased capacity utilization by 13 percent 
on adopting trucks. This implies that OBCs have enabled 3 percent higher capacity 
18 
utilization in the industry, which translates to billions of dollars of annual benefits. 
This increase appears to be mostly due to advanced capabilities that let dispatchers 
determine trucks' position in real time, and allow dispatchers and drivers to 
communicate while drivers are in their trucks. These capabilities enable dispatchers 
and drivers to keep trucks on the road and loaded more. 
In a study done by Winston (1985), it was discovered that entry and exit 
regulations raised carrier costs substantially, and rate distortions cost society about $1 
billion annually. Rate distortions were more serious in the less-than-truckload sector 
because they did not have the railroad alternative like the truckload sector did. It was 
expected that deregulation would decrease these inefficiencies. Adrangi, et al. (1995) 
used a profit function approach to investigate the issues of economies of scale and 
productive efficiency. He found that after deregulation, trucking firms changed their 
input mix in favor oflabor, and firms became for technologically advanced. In the 
post-deregulation period, an increased in capital input precipitated a reduction in labor 
input approximately 21 times greater than in the pre-deregulation period. The study 
proves that deregulation seems to have restored technical efficiency in the industry. 
Although, there is much evidence that deregulation increased efficiency in the 
trucking industry, there are studies that somewhat contradict this. McMullen and Lee 
(1999) analyzed data from 1976-1987 and found that average inefficiency in the 
motor carrier industry was between 14 percent and 27 percent for the entire period, 
with deregulation having no significant impact on efficiency. The Jack of increased 
efficiency could be explained by a few reasons: the industry still has not adjusted to 
deregulation, continued union restrictions add to inefficiencies, and there are 
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limitations in the data set. They also found that prior to deregulation, union firms 
were 1.5 percent less efficient than non-union firms and 4 percent Jess efficient 
after deregulation. 
Trucking firms also changed the quality and types of services they offered after 
deregulation. There was increased emphasis placed on efficiency. This was brought 
about by the adoption of just-in-time delivery systems and technology developments. 
Consumers benefited as firms strived to meet requirements for more reliable and 
frequent deliveries. This increased focus on efficiency reduced costs. The savings 
were passed on to consumers and businesses and have contributed to more 
competitively priced products. In fact, in 1996, the nation's freight bill hit an all 
times low. Shipping costs accounted for only 6 percent of GDP, down from 7.6 
percent in 1980 (Engel 1998). 
In a 1990 study, John Ying used a translog cost function to analyze direct and 
indirect effects of deregulation on trucking productivity. He used information from a 
sample of Class I and II common carriers of general freight because these firms often 
specialize in less-than-truckload shipments.2 Ying used a sample of61 firms from 
the years 1975-1984. A variety of operating characteristics were used in this analysis: 
average length of haul, percent L TL traffic, average shipment size, average cargo Joss, 
and average load. In the time period before deregulation (1975-1979), there was little 
productivity growth. In the time period after deregulation (1980-1984 ), there were 
changes in costs and thus productivity. Cost savings in 1981 were small at about 1 
percent, however, this increased to 23 percent in 1984. The characteristics that were 
2 Motor carriers of property are classified based on their adjusted annual operating revenue. Firms that 
have operating revenue greater than $10 million are classified as Class I, firms with revenue between $3-
10 million arc Class II, and those firms with revenues under $3 million are Class Ill. 
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statistically significant in bringing about reduced costs were: larger loads, a less 
valuable commodity mix, and a lower percentage of L TL traffic. Ying concluded that 
deregulation of the trucking industry forced firms to be more efficient, more 
aggressive, and to cut costs if they hoped to remain competitive. 
Other studies have found similar results that deregulation reduced costs thereby 
increasing productivity and efficiency. Profit margins have not been above 3 percent 
since the early 1980s and are often less than 2 percent. This once again confirms that 
businesses served by trucking firms and consumers are benefiting. Contrary to what 
many thought might happen, larger trucking firms are not benefiting from 
deregulation at the expense of smaller firms. In fact, smaller firms increased their 
profitability more than larger trucking firms after deregulation. Deregulation made 
the industry competitive enough so that there is no existence of monopolistic profit 
enjoyed by large trucking firms (Tang and Ma 2002). 
Other Effects of Deregulation 
The primary implications of deregulation that are discussed and analyzed are 
usually the effects on wages, costs, and efficiency. However, some research has 
shown a few other effects. 
Paid hours to both union and nonunion drivers decreased in the few years after 
deregulation. This could be due to the fact that nonunion workers are often paid not 
hourly, but on a mileage or freight basis. They are not paid for time they sit in traffic 
or during other down time (Engel 1998). Also, the average length of haul increased 
during the 1975-1985 period. This was due to the fact that deregulation allowed firms 
to expand geographically and allowed firms to serve more customers (Engel 1998). 
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Driver turnover has always been an issue in the trucking industry, but it 
worsened after deregulation. Increased workloads and lower pay were the two main 
factors that affected driver turnover rates. Labor turnover statistics estimated that 
labor turnover for large trucking firms in the truckload sector is between 80-100 
percent. Smaller firms in the truckload sector had a turnover rate of 60-80 percent, 
and in the less-than-truckload sector turnover rates were much lower at around 15 
percent. The total labor turnover rate for all types of firms was estimated at 3 8 
percent (Engel 1998). 
All of the above studies mentioned reach the same conclusion. Under 
regulation, firms did not focus on cost minimization and thus were not efficient or as 
productive as they could be. After deregulation, firms had to minimize costs and 
offered more customer oriented services in order to stay competitive. Shippers and 
consumers benefited from the reduced costs while the truck drivers suffered as a result 
oflower wages. 
NAFTA 
Prior to 1982, both Canadian and Mexico-domiciled motor carriers could apply 
for authority to operate within the U.S by filling out an application with the ICC. The 
U.S. did not make distinctions between domestic and foreign firms when deciding 
whether or not to give operating authority. However, this ended with the Bus 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1982. The Act was developed in response to complaints 
that Canada and Mexico were not allowing the same access of U.S. carriers into their 
countries as the U.S. was allowing them. Under the Act, Congress imposed a two-
year moratorium on the issuance of new grants of U.S. operating authority to motor 
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carriers of a foreign country. The legislation authorized the President to remove or 
modify the moratorium if he determined it to be in the interest of the nation. The 
moratorium was quickly lifted on Canada as issues were resolved, but not for Mexico 
because they did not lift restrictions on market access for U.S. firms (U.S. Department 
of Transportation, FMCSA). 
Certain firms were exempt from the moratorium including Mexican firms 
transporting goods straight to Canada, firms that had acquired operating authority 
prior to 1982 (this included only five Mexican carriers), and U.S.-owned Mexican-
domiciled truck companies (about 160 companies). The Mexican-domiciled firms 
that were not exempt from the moratorium were restricted to operating in a 
commercial zone that extended only three to twenty miles past the U.S. border. In 
order to operate in the commercial zone Mexican carriers had to obtain a Certificate 
of Registration from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (Condon and 
Sindha 2001). Similarly, U.S. trucks could not go more than three to twenty miles 
past the Mexican border. Because of these restrictions, trucking goods from the U.S. 
to Mexico and vice versa became time consuming, inefficient, and costly (Moore 
2004 ). The inefficiencies at the border provided evidence that something needed to 
be done to rectify the situation. Provisions ofNAFTA that pertained to the trucking 
industry were intended to do just that. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified by the U.S. 
Congress in late 1993 and implemented on January 1, 1994. The trade agreement was 
designed to promote free trade among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. The free trade 
agreement inevitably meant that trade flows between all three countries would 
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mcrease. In fact, from 1993 to 2000, there was a fourfold increase in two-way trade 
between the U.S. and Mexico. Since about 85 percent of the products traded between 
the U.S. and Mexico moves by truck and there are about four million border crossings 
annually, provisions ofNAFTA were written to end the inefficient border procedures 
in the trucking industry (Moore 2004). 
Considering that Mexico is one of the U.S.'s largest trading partners, many 
determined that provisions to NAFT A to reduce these inefficiencies at the border 
were needed. The terms ofNAFTA provided that the U.S. would lift the moratorium 
on Mexico-domiciled trucking firms. On January 1, 1994, the president modified the 
moratorium and the ICC began accepting applications from Mexico-domiciled 
passenger carriers to conduct international charter and tour bus operations in the U.S. 
Starting in December of 1995, Mexican and U.S. carriers were to be allowed to serve 
the border states of the other country. In the U.S., these border states were Arizona, 
California, New Mexico, and Texas. By January 1, 2000, trucks from both countries 
would be able to operate freely in each other's country. By the end of 1995, U.S. and 
Canadian firms would be able to acquire minority ownership in Mexican tucking 
companies providing international cargo services, they could have 51 percent 
ownership by 200 I, and 100 percent ownership by 2004. However, in December of 
1995 the U.S. stated that it would delay implementation of the NAFTA trucking 
provisions because of pressure from the !BT; safety concerns from environmental and 
consumer safety groups; and political pressure (U.S. Department of Transportation, 
FMCSA). 
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On September 22, 1998 Mexico initiated arbitral proceedings under NAFTA 
Chapter 20 claiming that the U.S. violated NAFTA by failing to phase out the 
restrictions on cross-border trucking. The U.S. continued to argue that the provisions 
were not being implemented because of safety concerns (The American Society of 
International Law 2003 ). 
Regardless of the arguments, a NAFTA panel determined that the U.S. 
restrictions were a breach of its NAFT A obligations. They did state, however, that the 
U.S. did not have to allow access for all Mexican trucking firms without regard to 
safety or other concerns, but could review applications from Mexican operators on a 
case-by-case basis. During his 2000 presidential campaign, President Bush stated that 
the U.S. should honor its NAFTA commitments regarding cross border trucking. He 
commited to Mexico's President Vicente Fox that the U.S. would fully open the 
border to international trucking. 
In 2002 Congress passed legislation that required a program to be established for 
inspecting, certifying, and verifying Mexican carriers to be safe and insure for 
operation in the U.S. Concerns regarding safety, compliance, and monitoring of 
Mexican commercial vehicles were resolved in the Transportation and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002 (U.S. Department of Transportation, FMCSA). 
The Act allowed Mexican trucking firms to apply for authority to operate within the 
commercial zone along the border, or they were allowed to apply for authority to 
operate beyond the commercial zone to their final destinations. The Mexican trucking 
firms, their vehicles, and their drivers operating within the U.S. are subject to all of 
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's safety requirements, inspection 
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procedures, enforcement mechanisms, fines, and out-of-service orders. They are also 
subject to various safety audits, compliance reviews, and roadside vehicle inspections 
(U.S. Department of Transportation). 
Some activist groups filed petitions in U.S. federal court alleging that the 
regulations violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air 
Act (CAA). The court ruled in their favor stating that they agreed with the 
importance of the U.S.'s compliance with its treaty obligations, but that the 
compliance cannot come at the cost of violating U.S. law (The American Journal of 
International Law, 2003). Delaying the implementation of the NAFTA trucking 
provisions have raised prices in the U.S. and discouraged the trucking industry in 
Mexico. On June 7, 2004, after years of arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of opening up cross-border trucking. Even after the ruling, border crossing is 
still time consuming because of administrative and legal requirements (Moore 2004). 
The trucking provisions ofNAFTA are still hotly debated. The main reason 
given for opposition has consistently been safety. Mexican trucking regulations on 
safety are very different from those in the U.S. and their industry is much different 
from the U.S. industry. Mexico's regulatory truck safety system is not as 
sophisticated as the U.S. and is inadequate to ensure that Mexican trucks entering the 
U.S. can meet the safety standards (U.S. House of Representatives 2001). 
Mexican trucks are often much older than U.S. trucks (the average Mexican 
truck is 15.5 years old and the average U.S. truck is only 5.5 years old), and don't 
meet the U.S. safety standards (Komis 2000). In 1998, the Department of 
Transportation reported that 44 percent of Mexican trucks do not meet safety 
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standards, compared to 27 percent of U.S. trucks. Safety standard failure rates varied 
among the border states. Twenty-eight percent of the Mexican-domiciled trucks 
inspected in California failed safety inspections, 42 percent in Arizona, 37 percent in 
New Mexico, and 50 percent in Texas. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration reported that in 2000, 36 percent of Mexico-domiciled trucks 
inspected at the border had a safety problem that required the trucks to be removed 
from service. The rate observed for U.S. trucks was 24 percent. 
Numerous safety standards differ between the U.S. and Mexico. Mexican 
regulations allow much longer trucks than most states in the U.S. do (Boyer 1997). 
The U.S. limits truck weights to 80,000 pounds, compared to Mexico's 97,000; the 
U.S. requires front-wheel brakes, and Mexico does not. Furthermore, Mexico does 
not require the maintenance of driving logs or other types of data that would be 
needed for enforcement (Condon and Sinha 2001). 
In reports issued in December 1998, November 1999, and May 2001, the DOT 
Inspector General stated finding that too few Mexican trucks are being inspected at 
the border, too few comply with U.S. safety regulations, and the U.S. does not have a 
consistent enforcement program that provides reasonable assurance of the safety of 
Mexican trucks entering the U.S. The reports cited lack of inspectors, lack of 
inspection facilities, lack of databases, and lack of enforcement as a cause for the high 
safety inspection failures. The same report also found that 254 Mexico-domiciled 
motor-carriers were operating illegally beyond the commercial zones in 24 states in 
1998. (U.S. House of Representatives 2001 ). 
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Studies have shown that the presence of a comprehensive and adequate 
inspection facility will lower the failure rates. Truckers are more inclined to adhere to 
safety standards if they know they are going to be inspected thoroughly. The border 
at Otay Mesa, California has a comprehensive inspection facility with trained 
inspectors and the failure rate for both U.S. and Mexico trucks was the same at 24 
percent. Areas that have inadequate inspection facilities have failure rates as high as 
60 percent (U.S. House of Representatives 2001). 
Although there is overwhelming evidence that Mexican-domiciled trucks are a 
safety concern, many promoters of the provisions ofNAFTA argued that the safety 
issues may not be as serious as they seem. 
Mexico has stated that because border crossing is so time consuming and 
requires modifications to trucks to meet safety standards, only the newest and best 
trucks are used to transport goods across the border. Mexican safety standards differ 
from the U.S. safety standards in areas, including the fact that they allow heavier 
trucks and don't restrict the number of consecutive hours drivers can work. This is a 
major safety concern, however, Canadian truckers have full access to the U.S. even 
though their safety standards allow for trucks that are 60 percent heavier than U.S. 
trucks and allow drivers to log 30 percent more consecutive driving hours than U.S. 
drivers (Schneider 2000). This is somewhat contradictory to the safety concerns 
given for not allowing Mexican trucks free access to the U.S. 
A study done by Moore (2004) stated that about 90 percent of Mexican truck 
drivers have only one truck, no insurance and no desire to travel to the U.S. where 
they don't know the language. Only the more modem and safer trucks are used for 
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long haul trips. According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the failure rate 
of Mexican trucks in California was 27 percent in 2000, this is just over the U.S. 
failure rate of 24 percent. 
Some proponents believe the safety concerns are a cover up to avoid 
competition from lower-paying Mexican firms. Boyer ( 1997) states that while 
Mexican firms do pay their drivers lower wages than U.S. firms, the U.S. firms will 
not face stiff competition because the Mexican firms cannot match the U.S. firms' 
productivity and efficiency. Also, the Mexican Trucking Association has advocated 
for continued delays for the trucking provisions ofNAFTA. They are concerned that 
the Mexican firms are not ready to compete with U.S. and Canadian firms and they 
need more time to modernize their fleets. They are also well aware that Mexican 
safety regulations are not very similar to U.S. safety standards (Schneider 2000). 
The U.S. fleet is much larger than the Mexican fleet. In 2002, there were about 
500,000 trucking companies in the U.S., compared to only 8,000 in Mexico. Of those 
8,000 firms in Mexico, only about 2,000 go beyond regional, owner-operated 
concerns. The 8,000 firms represent about 410,000 units, of which 160,000 are Class 
A trucks, and the U.S. has 2.8 million Class A trucks (Eisenhart 2002).3 It is obvious 
that the U.S. has a size advantage over Mexico. 
In a report done in the winter of 2001, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
predicted that few Mexican firms would immediately begin sending trucks into the 
U.S. They gave several factors for this belief; the Mexican firms would have 
difficulties finding affordable insurance, there would be a Jack of business 
·
1 Class A trucks are defined as trucks or truck combinations weighing with a Gross Vehicle Weight 
Rating of 26,00 I lbs. or more, provided towed vehicle is more than l 0,000 lbs. 
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relationships beyond the commercial zones, which may cause empty return trips, 
border congestion could affect profitability, and costly registration fees (Eisenhart 
2002). 
There are 27 ports of entry along the U .S.-Mexico border that process border 
crossings, however only seven of those carry 91 percent of the cross-border traffic. 
Texas has 15, Arizona has six, California has four and New Mexico has two. Of 
those, the ports at Laredo and Otay Mesa are by far the busiest. They average roughly 
2,500 commercial vehicles per day (Schneider 2000). 
Haralambides, Londono-Kent (2002) analyzed the inefficiencies at the border 
and the extra costs associated from those inefficiencies. In their analysis, they 
outlined a hypothetical shipment from Chicago, IL, USA to Monterrey, Mexico. The 
border crossing they chose was the Laredo border crossing because it is the largest 
border crossing between the U.S. and Mexico. This border accounts for 40 percent of 
trade by volume and 50 percent of trade by value. They determined that moving the 
shipment takes a total often movements, a minimum of three different trucks, and 
various pieces of equipment for loading and unloading. The total time to move the 
shipment from the U.S. to Mexico takes an average of32 hours if there is a team of 
drivers and about 48 hours if a driver is working alone. Total costs range from $1,813 
to $2,189. 
The costs and the amount of time it takes to get the load from Chicago to Laredo 
are the result of: trucking from Chicago to Laredo, handling costs and associated 
times of Mexican broker inspections for pre-clearance and storage, costs of loading 
and unloading, drayage costs and times of border crossings, inspections on the U.S. 
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and Mexican sides, and trucking from N uevo Laredo to Monterrey. It was determined 
that it takes longer to travel a few miles near the border than it does to travel from 
Chicago to Laredo. Reducing the time and costs associated with moving goods 
between the two countries may reduce the costs of the final goods. In fact a study 
completed by Jamieson and Harrison (2002) looked at the effects of free trade on 
prices. In their study, they analyzed the effects that free trade would have on Texas 
and Mexico, and determined that a border free of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers 
would decrease prices on goods traded between Texas and Mexico, which would 
increase trade. They also found that an open border should lead to reduced 
congestion, reduced accidents, and less pollution (air and noise) for Texas border 
communities. 
The inefficiencies described in the previous study are the cause of legal and 
institutional barriers and procedures imposed and tolerated by the two countries. 
Some examples of these barriers and procedures include: lack of coordinated 
procedures and data requirements for border crossing, border crossing infrastructure 
limitations, limited capacity in some inspection areas, business practices that 
unnecessarily create peak hours at border crossings, lack of government motivation to 
add needed personnel for 24-hour inspections, lack of leadership in the private sector 
and government to promote change for a more efficient border crossing system, and 
the different cultural environment between the two countries. These barriers add to 
the cost, congestion, delay, and pollution problems that already exist and prevent 
competition within the trucking industry (Haralambides and Londono-Kent 2004). 
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The trucking provisions ofNAFTA have not yet been implemented, thus are 
many barriers that are causing excess time delays and costs for trucking firms. 
Inefficiencies at the border are causing unnecessary congestion and excess paperwork 
in order for trucking firms to transport the products traded between the U.S. and 
Mexico. As trade continues to increase between the two countries, the inefficiencies 
are becoming more problematic. 
Summary 
NAFT A was implemented in order to promote free trade that would benefit all 
three countries involved by eliminating tariffs and other trade barriers in order to 
make trade more beneficial and efficient. However, the non-tariff trade barriers that 
still exist in the trucking provisions are hindering these efforts. Although few studies 
have been done specifically related to the trucking industry, past studies done on 
regulation and deregulation have shown that fewer restrictions allow for more 
competition and thus forces trucking firms to be cost minimizing, which in return 
benefits the final consumer. Also, eliminating the barriers would solve the 
congestion; pollution; safety; and inefficiency problems. This study specifically looks 
at the trucking industry to determine if the impending implementation of the NAFTA 
trucking provisions will force firms to become more cost effective and efficient. 
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CHAPTER3 
METHODOLOGY AND MODELS 
Trucking firms, by nature, are considered cost minimizing and can be analyzed 
by cost functions that describe the minimum cost of producing a certain level of 
output given the prices a firm must pay for factor inputs. 
The purpose of this specific study is to determine what effects the announcement 
to begin implementing the NAFTA trucking provisions has had on costs for U.S. 
trucking firms. A translog cost function is used to analyze these effects. This method 
has been used in other studies. For example, Ying (1990a) used a translog cost 
function in order to analyze the productivity gains in the trucking industry following 
deregulation. McGeehan ( 1993) uses the translog cost function in order to determine 
changes in costs and productivity in the railroad industry in Ireland. 
In this study, a translog cost function can be used to show the change in costs as 
a function ofy (output quantities) and w (input prices) and other operating 
characteristics as shown below: 
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where C represents total operating costs; y represents three outputs: total intercity 
miles, total intercity tons, and total intercity shipments; w represents various input 
prices: average wage per worker, insurance costs per mile, equipment rental cost per 
mile, capital, and diesel price; A is operating characteristics: border state, outsourcing, 
and less-than-truckload; N is the NAFT A dummy variable; and T represents the time 
trend. This cost function is similar to the one used in Ying (1990a). The cost function 
is symmetric and homogeneous of degree one in prices, given y. This implies that 
L,/3, = I (2) 
and 
Ir,, =Ir,, =Ir,y =O. (3) 
We could estimate equation (I) directly, but efficiency gains can be realized by 
estimating the cost-minimizing input demand functions transformed into cost share 
equations. Equation(!) can be logarithmically differentiated with respect to input 
prices, and by the Shephard's Lemma, we obtain cost equation of the following form 
/ 
wX 81nC 81nw =-'-; =S, 
' C ' 
(4) 
where S, represents the cost share equation for each input. The translog cost function 
yields the cost share equations. 
S, =a,+ 'f.am lnym + LY,, In w, + '[_y,,A, + Y,.vN + Y,,T. (5) 
m k 
The cost share equations must equal the total cost 
n 
'[_w,X, =C, (6) 
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and the sum of the cost shares must be equal to one: 
IS, =I. (7) 
The cost function and factor share equations are jointly estimated by iterating 
Zellner's two-step procedure for estimating seemingly unrelated regressions. 
However, since the procedure requires the disturbances on the share equations to sum 
to zero for each firm, one of the cost share equations must be deleted from the system 
to obtain a nonsingular covariance matrix. 
Allen partial elasticities of substitution can be computed from the cost function 
by the formula 
(8) 
where i and j represent partial differentiation of the cost function with respect to factor 
prices and 
er,, =(yu +S,S 1 )/ S,S1 , (9) 
er,,= (y,, +S,' -S,)/S,2 , i * j 
The Allen partial elasticities measure the change in quantity of the ith factor 
input in response to a change in the price ofthejth factor. A positive sign indicates 
that the two inputs are substitutes and a negative sign indicates complements. 
Estimates of the input elasticities are evaluated at their sample means. The associated 
asymptotic standard errors are also computed using the following: 
S.E. = S.E(r,, )/S,S1 
S.E. = S.E.(r,' )/s,2 
(JO) 
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The effect ofNAFTA trucking provision implementation announcement on 
productivity can be measured by calculating the percentage change in costs due to a 
unit change in the NAFT A variable as follows 
(c, -C, )IC,. Joo= [ exp(aN + ~r mN lnym + ~r,N In w,m 
+ Lh,A, + YNTT)-1} 100 
k 
(11) 
In calculating equation 11, the variables are held at their means for years 4 and 
5. The percentage change in costs is evaluated for 2002 and 2003 because the 
announcement that the process to begin implementing the NAFT A trucking 
provisions was made in 2002. Limiting the equation to 2002 and 2003 shows the 
effects the announcement has had on costs in the first years after it was discussed. 
Equation (11) can be modified slightly to show the net effects the operating 
characteristic variables have had on total costs and can be written as follows, 
(c, -C, )IC, -IOO=[exp( aA + ~YmAlnym + ~r,Alnw,m 
+r.wN+yA,.T-1}100 
(12) 
Hypotheses 
The underlying problem in this thesis is determining how the possible 
implementation of the NAFT A trucking provisions will economically affect the 
United States trucking industry. More specifically, we want to determine the effects 
the impending implementation has had on the total costs for trucking firms. 
Trucking companies are assumed to be cost-minimizing in the long run. The 
long run cost minimizing function used will be TC = TC (w, y, A, N), where w 
represents the various input prices such as diesel fuel price; wages; insurance 
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premiums; rents of capital; and equipment, and y represents the output variables 
(intercity miles, intercity tons, and intercity shipments). N represents a dummy 
variable for the announcement of the implementation ofNAFTA trucking provisions. 
The N variable is the primary test condition in this study. The variable A represents 
various operating characteristics as listed and include if the firm: 
I. Is a border state to Mexico (Arizona, Texas, California, or New Mexico). 
Since these states lie right along the U .S./Mexico border, they may take a 
direct hit from the NAFTA implementations. They may experience more 
competition from Mexican firms than firms in other states. 
2. Classifies itself as a less-than-truckload (L TL) carrier. A carrier is classified as 
a L TL carrier if the firm gets the majority of its revenue from loads ofless 
than 10,000 pounds (Department of Transportation, FMCSA). LTL cargo 
often is consolidated and may require the use of a terminal network where 
freight is gathered, combined, loaded, moved, unloaded, sorted, loaded, and 
finally taken to its final destination, thus it might be expected that carrying 
L TL cargo may add to costs (Ying 1990a). Many other studies have used this 
operating characteristic in the research and these will be discussed later in this 
paper. 
3. Outsources by hiring equipment and drivers. Firms are defined as outsourcing 
firms if they pay to rent equipment, drivers, or a combination of equipment 
and drivers. This characteristic is important to include because it may be more 
efficient for some firms to rent equipment or drivers rather than purchase new 
equipment or have drivers on staff full-time. Firms may also hire self-
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employed drivers that own their own truck if extra labor is needed or to cut 
down on costs. Nickerson and Silverman (2003) found in their study that in 
the absence of externalities, many companies would prefer to contract with 
owner-operators because these types of drivers tend to take better care of their 
equipment and drive more safely than a driver using a company truck would. 
However, firms may prefer to hire drivers to drive company owned trucks 
when they need to coordinate the activities of their drivers more, as is the case 
of L TL carriers or when they invest more in their reputation. 
Controlling for outputs and input prices, we wish to observe how the A and N 
variables affect total costs for trucking firms. We will make various hypotheses from 
this information. First we can look at how certain operating characteristics may affect 
total costs after the announcement regarding the NAFTA trucking provisions was 
made. If the trucking company is domiciled in a border state, we would expect a 
negative impact on costs. These companies stand the most risk of increased 
competition from Mexican firms, thus they will be forced to be more efficient to ward 
off the possible new competition. I would expect that L TL firms would have a 
positive impact on costs since these carriers require more terminal consolidation and 
stops for pickup and deliveries. I expect that firms that engage in outsourcing some of 
their work would have a negative impact on costs because a business generally 
outsources if it makes more economical sense than doing it themselves. Finally and 
most importantly, I expect the N variable to have a negative impact on a firm's total 
costs. The 2002 announcement that the U.S. would begin the process of 
implementing the trucking provisions ofNAFTA would more than likely encourage 
38 
firms to become more cost effective in order to continue to be competitive if Mexican 
firms are allowed to begin operating in the U.S. 
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CHAPTER4 
DATA 
Data used in this paper were obtained from the Class I and II Motor Carriers of 
Property and Household Goods Annual Report. The collection of for-hire trucking 
company financial and operating data is a mandatory program. All Class I and Class 
II motor carriers are required to submit Form M annually. Class I carriers must also 
file quarterly reports.4 The data collection is managed by the Office of Motor Carrier 
Information (OMCI) of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). Motor carrier 
data was used for the period of 1999-2003 for this study. This information was 
obtained from the BTS's Intermodal Transportation Database. Average regional diesel 
prices for each year were obtained from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA). The EIA gives average diesel prices for eight regions which include: New 
England, Central Atlantic, Lower Atlantic, Midwest, Gulf Coast, Rocky Mountain, 
West Coast, and California. 
Firms with missing data or data with obvious errors were dropped. Also, firms 
classified as specialty freight or household good carriers were dropped since these 
types of firms require specialized methods and procedures for carrying only specific 
goods and thus aren't necessarily comparable to general freight carriers. After 
making these omissions, the sample size is 3076. All dollar values were adjusted for 
inflation with 2000 as the base year. Descriptive statistics for all variables are listed 
in Table I. 
4 Motor carriers of property are classified based on their adjusted annual operating revenue. Firms that 
have operating revenue greater than $IO million are classified as Class I, firms with revenue between $3-
10 million are Class II, and those firms with revenues under $3 million are Class III. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation Value Value 
Outputs (Y) 
Intercity miles 96000000 203000 1930000000 
Intercity tons 64600000 1035 1450000000 
Intercity shipments 11200000 164 573000000 
Input Prices (w) 
Average Wage 11432 10700 98975 
Insurance premium per mile 0.18 0.002 5.93 
Equipment rent per mile 1.7 0.000009 72.58 
Capital 33141 1112 883133 
Diesel price 15.22 106.8 167.2 
Characteristic variables (A) 
Border state 0.32 0 1 
Less-than-truckload 0.38 0 1 
Outsource 0.45 0 1 
1999 0.39 0 1 
2000 0.42 0 1 
2001 0.42 0 1 
2002 0.41 0 1 
2003 0.36 0 1 
NAFTA 0.48 0 1 
Three different output variables were used: total intercity miles, total intercity 
tonnage, and total intercity shipments. 5 Total intercity miles is the amount of miles a 
firm Jogs each year, total intercity tonnage is the amount of goods carried each year 
measured in tons and total intercity shipments is the number of hauls a firm Jogs each 
year. Average total intercity mileage was at 24.5 million, average tonnage was about 
8.7 million, and average number of intercity shipments was about 712,000. 
Five different input prices were used: average wage, insurance premium per 
mile, equipment rent per mile, price of capital, and diesel price. Average wage was 
computed using the total wages paid to all employees ( drivers, helpers, cargo 
5 Many past studies use revenue-ton-miles as output, however, data limitations did not make that feasible, 
thus the three outputs were used to effectively show output. 
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handlers, and administrative) divided by the number of employees. The average wage 
amounted to $43,126. The minimum wage was calculated at $10,700 which may 
seem low, however this can be attributed to part-time workers such as cargo handlers 
that earn lower wages, but are still accounted for in the total number of employees. 
The maximum wage is $98,976, which may seem rather high, however, it is important 
to note that the average wage is calculated using wages for all workers, including 
managers and other office workers. Further analysis of the wage data shows that only 
1 percent of the firms' average wage is over $75,767. 
Insurance premium per mile was calculated by taking total insurance expenses 
( cargo loss and damage premiums and claims paid, liability and property damage 
premiums and claims paid, and other insurance expenses) divided by total intercity 
miles. The equipment rent per mile value is composed of the sum of equipment 
rentals with drivers and equipment rentals without drivers divided by total intercity 
miles. Rental cost is important because many trucking firms choose to rent trucks or 
drivers or both if they don't have the capacity to handle all the shipments on their own 
or if it is less costly than owning their own. 
Capital was measured by taking total operating expenses and subtracting total 
wage and salary expenses, total insurance expenses, total equipment rental expenses, 
and total fuel costs and dividing this amount by the average number of owned and 
leased equipment. Average fuel prices, measured in cents, for each year came from 
the yearly regional averages reported by the EIA. Since fuel prices vary across the 
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*country, each firm was assigned a price depending on which region the firm is 
domiciled in.6 
Besides input and output variables, various dummy characteristic variables are 
used in this model. The border state dummy variable represents states that are 
adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. Firms based out of any of the border states 
(Texas, California, New Mexico, Arizona) are given a value of one, while the firms 
based out of other states are given a value of zero. The descriptive statistics indicate 
that about 11 percent of the firms used in this analysis are based in one of the four 
border states. This variable is important because firms in the border states may do a 
larger amount of trans border shipments because of their location and thus may be 
affected by NAFT A more than the other states. 
Firms also characterize themselves based on the type of carriage that makes up 
the majority of their revenue. There are three different classifications firms can 
choose from: general freight, household goods, and specialty freight. 7 Only firms that 
classified themselves as general freight were used because firms classified as carriers 
of household goods or specialty freight are not comparable to general freight carriers 
since these types of firms require specialized methods and procedures for carrying 
only specific goods. General freight firms can classify themselves further as less-than-
truckload (L TL) carriers, truckload carriers (TL), parcel carriers or container carriers. 
A dummy characteristic variable is used for L TL carriers, firms that classify 
6 Average fuel prices are given by eight different regions in the U.S. Since it was not feasible to obtained 
fuel price infonnation for individual finns, the finn's fuel price is determined by location of the company 
headquarters. By doing so, I implicitly assume that, although firms may have nationwide networks. their 
operations tend to be more intense in their own domiciled regions. 
7 General freight is defined as miscellaneous commodities not requiring special handling or revenue 
equipment. Specialty freight is identified as freight requiring special handling and/or revenue equipment. 
43 
themselves as L TL are given a value of 1 and a value of O if they are classified as one 
of the other types. This characteristic is important because L TL carriers require more 
terminal consolidation and stops for pickup and deliveries. 
The outsource characteristic variable indicates whether firms hire additional 
equipment and drivers in addition to their own equipment. This variable is significant 
as over 70 percent of the firms in this data set attribute some of their operating cost to 
hiring equipment and drivers from an outside source. 
Nineteen percent of the data came from the 1999 annual reports, 23 percent from 
2000, 22 percent from 2001, 21 percent from 2002, and 15 percent from 2003. This 
shows a fairly equitable distribution of data from each year. The NAFT A 
announcement variable has a mean of0.36, which indicates that 36 percent of the firm 
data came from years 2002 and 2003. The announcement that the process to begin 
implementing the NAFTA trucking provisions was not formally announced until mid-
2002, so 2002 and 2003 would be considered the first years when the announcement 
may have affected total costs (U.S. Department of Transportation 2002). 
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CHAPTERS 
RES UL TS AND ANALYSIS 
Translog Cost Estimates 
The translog cost function and the four cost share equations were estimated 
jointly using the method of iterated maximum likelihood. The results from the 
translog cost function are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Translog Cost Function Parameter Estimates 
R Chi 
Observations RMSE S9uared S9uared 
3053 0.2859 0.9584 73577.39 
Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error t 
Tons -0.0498 0.0444 -1.12 
Shipments -0.1064 0.0543 -1.96 
Miles 0.9623 0.0865 11.12 
Labor -1.9036 0.2807 -6.78 
Diesel 0.558 0.2963 1.88 
Equipment Rent 0.0089 00487 0.18 
Capital 0.2546 0.0869 2.93 
Outsource 0.3447 0.1899 1.82 
Border State 0.4379 0.2274 1.93 
Less-than-truckload -0.5361 0.2081 -2.58 
NAFTA 0.6498 0.3193 204 
Time -0.1451 0.1135 -1.28 
Tons• Tons -0.0046 0.001 -4.5 
Tons• Shipments -0.0058 0.0018 -3.25 
Tons• Miles 0.0237 0.0044 5.4 
Shipments• Shipments -0.0134 0.0017 -7.84 
Shipments • Miles 0.0564 0.0052 10.91 
Miles• Miles -0.0356 0.0052 -6.88 
Tons• Labor 0.105 0.0058 1.81 
Tons • Diesel -0.0212 0.0066 -3.2 
Tons • Equipment Rental -0.0002 0.0012 -0.2 
Tons • Capital 0.0001 0.0024 0.03 
Shipments • Labor 0.0435 0.0072 6.07 
Shipments • Diesel -0.0757 0.0078 -9.66 
Shipments • Equipment Rental -0.0032 0.0014 -2.29 
Shipments• Capital 
-0.0046 0.0029 -1.61 
Miles • Labor -0 0464 0.0116 -4.01 
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Table 2. ( continued) 
Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error t 
Miles • Diesel 0.1004 0.013 7.72 
Miles • Equipment Rental -0 0057 0.0023 -2.51 
Miles • Capital 
-0.0133 0.0046 -2.91 
Tons • Outsource 
-0.0087 0.0042 -2.06 
Tons • Border State -0.0091 0.0046 -1.97 
Tons • Less-than-truckload 0.0027 0.0047 0.57 
Shipments • Outsource 0.0087 0.0056 1.54 
Shipments • Border State -0.0012 0.006 -0.2 
Shipments• Less-than-truckload 0.0119 0.0059 2.03 
Miles • Outsource 0.0026 0.0086 0.3 
Miles • Border State -0.0005 0.0097 -0.05 
Miles • Less-than-truckload -0.0258· 0.0094 -2.75 
Outsource • Border -0.0233 0.0239 -0.97 
Outsource • Less-than-truckload -0 0699 0.02 -3.49 
Border • Less-than-truckload 0.0413 0.0223 1.85 
Tons• NAFTA -0.0107 0.0072 -1.47 
Shipments• NAFTA -0.0249 0.0102 -2.44 
Miles• NAFTA 0.0372 0.0134 2.78 
Tons• Time 
-0.0002 0.0026 -0.08 
Shipments• Time -0.003 0.0038 -0.79 
Miles *Time 0.0036 0.0049 0.73 
Labor • Labor 0.2612 0.039 6.69 
Diesel • Diesel 0.1094 0.0559 1.96 
Equipment Rental • Equipment 
Rental 0.0422 0.0014 30.4 
Capital • Capital 0.022 0.0053 4.19 
Labor • Diesel -0.2758 0.0873 -3.16 
Labor• Equipment Rental 0.0513 0.0127 3.95 
Labor• Capital 
-0.0223 0.022 -1.01 
Diesel • Equipment Rental -0.0267 0.015 -1.78 
Diesel • Capital 0.0029 0.0269 0.11 
Equipment Rental • Capital 
-0.0086 0.0052 -1.66 
Labor • Outsource -0.0806 0.0265 -3.05 
Labor • Border State -0.0193 0.03 -0.64 
Labor • Less-than-truckload 0.013 0.0288 0.45 
Diesel • Outsource 0.0755 0.0314 2.4 
Diesel • Border State 0.0222 0.0341 0.65 
Diesel • Less-than-truckload 0.0735 0.0326 2.26 
Equipment Rental • Outsource 0.0063 0.0046 1.35 
Equipment Rental • Border State 0.0117 0.006 1.94 
Equipment Rental • Less-than-
truckload 0.0035 0.0053 0.65 
Capital • Outsource 0.0015 0.0098 0.15 
Capital • Border State 
-0.0157 0.011 -1.43 
Capital • Less-than-truckload 0.0225 0.0109 2.06 
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Table 2. ( continued) 
Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error t 
Labor * NAFTA -0.0025 0.0411 -0.06 
Diesel* NAFTA -0.0331 0.0479 -0.69 
Equipment Rental• NAFTA 0.0205 0.0073 2.82 
Capital* NAFTA -0.0201 0.0148 -1.36 
Labor• Time 0.0122 0.0151 0.81 
Diesel • Time -0.0285 0.0174 -1.63 
Equipment Rental • Time -0.0023 0.0027 -0.84 
Capital • Time 0.003 0.0055 0.54 
Time *Time 0.0243 0.0079 3.09 
NAFTA -0.1039 0.0398 -2.61 
Outsource • Time 0.0031 0.0104 0.3 
Border State • Time -0.01 0.0127 -0.79 
Less-than-truckload • Time -0.0171 0.0133 -1.28 
Outsource • NAFTA -0.0223 0.0283 -0.79 
Border State * NAFTA 0.0079 0.0346 0.23 
Less-than-truckload • NAFTA 0.0602 0.0344 1.75 
Intercept 11.3442 1.2541 9.05 
The total intercity miles variable has a positive coefficient value which indicates 
a positive impact on costs; the more miles a firm logs, the higher their costs will be. 
The cost elasticity of intercity miles is 0.946, suggesting that a l percent increase in 
output causes total cost to rise 0.946 percent, ceteris paribus. The total intercity 
shipment coefficient is negative and significant, meaning carrying more shipments 
decreases costs, which is opposite of what might be expected. Also, the cost elasticity 
of the total intercity tons variable has a small negative value, indicating that neither of 
the latter two output variables contributes significantly to total costs. The total 
intercity tonnage and total intercity shipment variables are not significant. The fact 
that intercity was the only significant output variable may indicate that it makes up the 
majority of the costs. 
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Three of the input price variables prove to be significant in this model. The 
capital price variable is highly significant and positive. The coefficient for capital 
indicates that one percent increase in capital expenditures causes total costs to 
increase by .29 percent. The labor input variable is also significant, but with a 
negative value. The diesel coefficient indicates that a once percent increase in diesel 
expenditures causes total costs to increase by .558 percent. The equipment rental cost 
per mile variable has a small positive coefficient value, but is not significant in the 
model. The cost elasticities of the input variables indicate that capital contributes the 
most to total costs. 
The NAFT A variable is significant at the 5 percent level. All three of the 
characteristic variables are significant in the model. The effects of these variables on 
total costs will be discussed later in the paper. 
Direct Effects of Time on Costs 
In this translog cost function, a time variable is included to capture the 
unobserved factors over time after controlling for various firms' characteristics and 
the effect ofNAFTA announcement. direct effects of time on total costs are calculated 
and shown in Table 3. 
The results posted in Table 3 indicate that total costs were indeed decreasing 
from 1999 to 2001 but at a diminishing rate. Costs were reduced by 13.83 percent in 
1999 and this had decreased to 13.22 percent in 2001. The main variable that 
attributed to the cost decrease in addition to time was the diesel variable. This is 
somewhat speculative given the fact that diesel prices actually increased during that 
time period, however, it is important to note that neither the diesel variable nor any of 
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the other input variable interaction terms with time are significant. In 2002, the in 
which the NAFT A announcement was made, costs decreased by 22.08 percent. In 
2003 costs decreased by 21.3 7 percent. In addition to just the time variable 
decreasing costs, the NAFT A variable also contributed great! y to the reduced costs 
and this interaction term is significant. The fact that costs are decreasing at a 
diminishing rate could indicate that the effect ofNAFTA on costs will eventually 
disappear after the industry has fully adjusted. 
The border state and L TL characteristic variables carry negative signs which 
indicate that they have added to cost savings over time. The outsource variable is 
positive indicating that it has added to costs over time, however, all of these 
interaction terms also prove to be insignificant at the IO percent level. 
Table 3. Percentage Change in Costs Due to Time 
Time• Time* Time* Time• Time* Time* 
Year Time Tons Shipment Miles Labor Diesel Rent 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
-0.1451 -0.0002 -0.003 0.0036 0.0233 -0.0285 -0.0023 
Year 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
-0.1451 
-0.1451 
-0.1451 
-0.1451 
Time* 
Capital 
0.003 
0.006 
0.009 
0.012 
0.015 
-0.0004 -0.006 0.0072 0.0244 
-0.0006 -0.009 0.0108 0.0366 
-0.0008 -0.012 0.0144 0.0488 
-0.001 -0.015 0.018 0.061 
Time* Time* Time* Time* 
OUT BOR LTL Time 
0.0031 -0.01 -0.0171 0.0243 
0.0031 -0.01 -0.0171 0.0486 
0.0031 -0.01 -0.0171 0.0729 
0.0031 -0.01 -0.0171 0.0972 
0.0031 -0 01 -0 0171 0.1215 
Direct Effects ofNAFTA Variable on Costs 
-0.057 -0 0046 
-0.0855 -0.0069 
-0.114 -0.0092 
-0.1425 -0.0115 
percent 
Time* Change 
NAFTA Total C 
0 -13.83 
0 -14.01 
0 -13.22 
-0.1168 -22.08 
-0.1168 -21.37 
The NAFT A variable has a positive coefficient variable and is statistically 
significant. This is alarming at first glance, being the hypothesis of this study was that 
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the NAFT A variable would reduce costs over time, but we must calculate the total 
effect ofNAFTA on costs. To accomplish this, we must use equation (11) to 
calculate the percentage change in cost due to NAFT A. The direct effect is evaluated 
at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for the years 2002 and 2003, 
and at a discrete change from O to I for binary variables. It was noted earlier that this 
analysis is only done for the years 2002 and 2003 because the announcement that 
steps would be taken to begin implementing the trucking provisions ofNAFTA was 
made in 2002. The results are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Percentage Change in Cost Due to NAFT A 
Year N N*Tons N*Shie N*Miles N*Labor N*Diesel N*Rent 
2002 0.6498 -0.1358 -0.2552 0.5903 -0.0266 -0.1636 -0.0358 
2003 0.6498 -0.1339 -0.2545 0.5902 -0.0266 -0.1664 -0.0379 
percent 
Change 
Year N*Caeital N"OUT N*BOR N*LTL N*T TotalC 
2002 -0.1895 -0 0223 0.0079 0.0602 -0.4156 6.59 
2003 -0.1894 -0.0223 0.0079 0.0602 -0.5195 -4.16 
The first order parameter estimate for the NAFT A variable as computed in the 
translog cost function was a value of .6498, which would indicate that the cost 
elasticity ofNAFTA has increased over time. However it is important to isolate the 
N AFT A variable and to calculate the percentage change in costs due to a unit change 
in the NAFT A variable. The results of equation (12) indicate that the NAFT A variable 
had a 6.59 percent increase on total costs in the first year after the announcement to 
begin steps to implement the NAFT A trucking provisions was made known. In 2003, 
the NAFT A variable caused costs to decrease by 4.16 percent. The fact that costs 
actually increased in 2002 could be because it took time for the industry to adjust. 
The results in Table 4 also show that the time and NAFT A interaction term and the 
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capital and NAFT A interaction term are contributing the most to the outcome of the 
percentage change calculation. Only the equipment rental interaction term is 
significant. 
The results of the percentage change in costs due to NAFT A are quite consistent 
with results of other similar studies. Ying (1990a) used a similar translog cost 
function to determine the effects deregulation had on costs in the trucking industry. 
His results show an increase in costs of about 7 .25 percent in the first year after 
deregulation, but show cost savings of 1.1 percent in the second year. By the fifth 
year after deregulation, in 1984, costs were decreased by nearly 23 percent. The 
slight increase in costs in the first year can be attributed to taking time for the industry 
to adjust. Since the trucking provisions ofNAFT A have not been fully implemented, 
the industry hasn't necessarily had to completely adjust, only prepare for the changes 
that may come when the NAFT A trucking provisions are being fully carried out. 
Blair et al. (1986) looked at the effects motor carrier deregulation had on the 
state of Florida. This study found that the removal of state regulatory constraints on 
the trucking industry had a 14 percent decrease in rates, which can be directly related 
to a decrease on operating costs. The paper also concluded that removing restrictions 
on the trucking industry resulted in efficiency improvements which reduced costs of 
providing trucking services. 
The negative sign on the interaction terms involving NAFT A and the outsource 
characteristic variable indicates that more outsourcing helps to reduce costs, however, 
this term is insignificant. The interaction terms involving the L TL and border 
characteristic variables have a positive sign indicating that having more L TL traffic 
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and traveling in border states adds to costs over time. Only the L TL interaction term is 
significant. 
Direct Effects oflnput Price Variables on Costs 
It is important to examine how the input price variables have affected total costs 
since the NAFT A announcement. The first input price analyzed was the labor wage. 
The results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Percentage Change in Costs Due to Labor Costs 
Labor* Labor" Labor" Labor" Labor* Labor" 
Year Labor Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel Rent 
1999 -1.9036 1.3495 0.4512 -0.7366 2.7751 -1.3033 -0.0987 
2000 -1.9036 1.3323 0.4647 -0.7342 2.7793 -1.3821 -0.0957 
2001 -1.9036 1.3257 0.4448 -0.7315 2.7777 -1.3654 -0.0901 
2002 -1.9036 1.3137 0.4459 -0.7315 2.7822 -1.3635 -0.0896 
2003 -1.9036 1.3137 0.4447 -0.7361 2.7796 -1.3862 -0.0949 
% 
Labor" Labor" Labor* Labor" Labor• Labor* Change 
Year Caeital OUT BOR LTL T N Total C 
1999 -0.2099 -0.0806 -0.0193 0.013 0.0122 0 0.249 
2000 -0.2099 -0.0806 -0.0193 0.013 0.0244 0 0.1883 
2001 -02092 -0.0806 -0.0193 0.013 0.0366 0 0.1981 
2002 -0.2092 -0.0806 -0.0193 0.013 0.0488 -0.0025 0.2038 
2003 -0.2091 -0.0806 -0.0193 0.013 0.061 -0.0025 0.1797 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year and at a discrete change from O to I for binary variables. 
In general, we expect labor costs to continue to increase over time, and from 
1999-2003, we see that labor costs are increasing, but at a decreasing rate. Labor 
wages increased total costs by 0.249 percent in 1999 and by 0.180 percent in 2003, 
the lowest increase in the five year period. It is important to note that the increase is 
less in 2003 than in 2002, which could indicate that labor costs wages, are decreasing 
after the NAFTA announcement. But it is also important to note that this trend 
actually started in 1999 which could indicate that there are other factors that have 
caused labor costs to rise but at a lower rate since 1999. 
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The diesel fuel price has an unexpected negative effect on costs, as the results in 
Table 6 indicate. It is somewhat surprising that diesel price has had a negative impact 
on costs given that the trend has been that diesel prices increased during these years. 
The results of Table 6 appear to be implausible and could be due to the regional diesel 
price values used in the model. The firms were assigned a yearly average diesel price 
depending on where the firm is domiciled, however it is known that firm's trucks may 
travel out of the home area and thus the assigned diesel price may not best represent a 
firm's diesel price. This discrepancy in diesel prices may have created the unexpected 
negative net effects. 
Table 6. Percentage Change in Cost Due to Diesel Price 
Diesel* Diesel* Diesel· Diesel* Diesel* Diesel* 
Year Diesel Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel Rent 
1999 0.558 -0.2725 -0.7852 1.5938 -2.9302 0.517 0.0514 
2000 0.558 -0.269 -0.8087 1.5886 -2.9346 0.5482 0.0498 
2001 0.558 -0.2677 -0.774 1.5828 -2.933 0.5416 0.0469 
2002 0.558 -0.269 -0.7759 1.5933 -2.9377 0.5409 0.0466 
2003 0.558 -0.2652 -0.7739 1.5929 -2.935 0.5499 0.0494 
% 
Diesel* Diesel* Diesel* Diese\* Diesel,,, Diesel"' Change 
Year Capital OUT BOR LTL T N Total C 
1999 0.0273 0.0755 -0.0222 0.0735 -0.0285 0 -1.1421 
2000 0.0273 0.0755 -0.0222 0.0735 -0.057 0 -1.1707 
2001 0.0272 0.0755 -0.0222 0.0735 -0.0855 0 -1.1768 
2002 -0.0272 0.0755 -0.0222 0.0735 -0.114 -0.0331 -1.2913 
2003 -0.0272 0.0755 -0.0222 0.0735 -0.1425 -0.0331 -1.2999 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year, and at a discrete change from Oto I for binary variables. 
Table 7 shows the direct effect of the equipment/driver rental variable on total 
costs. The rental cost has had a positive impact on costs since 1999 which was fairly 
steady until 200 I. After the NAFT A announcement, the positive effect of the 
equipment rental variable increased slightly. In 1999 the variable had a positive 0.159 
percent impact on total costs and this increased to 0.1766 percent in 2002. This 
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indicates that firms are spending more on renting equipment and hiring owner-
operators. Equipment and driver rents have a positive impact on firms' costs. 
Table 7. Percentage Change in Costs Due to Equipment and Driver Rents 
Rent" Rent* Rent* Rent" Rent• Rent• 
Year Rent Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel Rent 
1999 0.0089 -0.0026 -0.0332 -0.0905 0.545 -0.1262 -0.0812 
2000 0.0089 -0.0025 -0.0342 -0.0902 0.5459 -0.1338 -0.0787 
2001 0.0089 -0.0025 -0.0327 -0.0899 0.5455 -0.1322 -0.0741 
2002 0.0089 -0.0025 -0.0328 -0.0905 0.5464 -0.132 -0.0737 
2003 0.0089 -0.0025 -0.0327 -0.0904 0.5459 -0.1342 -0.0781 
% 
Rent* Rent* Rent* Rent* Rent* Rent* Change 
Year Caeital OUT BOR LTL T N Total C 
1999 -0.0809 0.0063 0.0117 0.0035 -0.0023 0 0.1586 
2000 -0.0809 0.0063 0.0117 0.0035 -0.0046 0 0.1513 
2001 -0.0807 0.0063 0.0117 0.0035 -0.0069 0 0.157 
2002 -0.0807 0.0063 0.0117 0.0035 -0.0092 0.0205 0.1759 
2003 -0.0807 0.0063 0.0117 0.0035 -0.0115 0.0205 0.1667 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year, and at a discrete change from O to I for binary variables. 
The results of the capital input price variable on total costs are shown in Table 8. 
The capital price variable has a very small and almost negligible impact on costs from 
1999-200 I. In 2002 and 2003 this impact becomes a very small negative impact. 
This may be due to the fact that increases in capital expenditure enhance firms' 
operations and thereby lower firms' production costs. For example Hubbard (1993) 
found that firms that increased their usage of high tech devices have greatly improved 
efficiency. Firms may be finding that investing in technologically advanced 
equipment greatly increases efficiency and thus reduces costs. It may also be 
assumed that investing in newer, more fuel efficient trucks would reduce costs as 
well. Thus investment in higher technology capital reduces costs, but by a small 
degree. 
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Table. 8 Percentage Change in Costs Due to Capital Costs 
Capital• Capital• Capital• Capital• Capitar Capital" 
Year Caeital Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel Rent 
1999 0.2546 0.0013 -0.0477 -0.2111 -0.2369 0.0137 0.0166 
2000 0.2546 0.0013 -0 0491 -0.2104 -0.2373 0.0145 0.016 
2001 0.2546 0.0013 -0.047 -0.2097 -0.2371 0.0144 0.0151 
2002 0.2546 0.0013 -0.0471 -0.2111 -0.2482 0.0143 0.015 
2003 0.2546 0.0013 -0.047 -0.211 -0.2373 0.0146 0.0159 
% 
Capital• Capitar Capitar Capital• Capital• Capital• Change 
Year Caeital OUT BOR LTL T N Total C 
1999 0.207 0.0015 -0.0157 0.0225 0.003 0 0.0074 
2000 0.2071 0.0015 -0.0157 0.0225 0.006 0 0.0097 
2001 0.2064 0.0015 -0.0157 0.0225 0.009 0 0.0139 
2002 0.2064 0.0015 -0.0157 0.0225 0.012 -0.0201 -0.0159 
2003 0.2063 0.0015 -0.0157 0.0225 0.015 -0.0201 -0.0007 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year, and at a discrete change from O to I for binary variables. 
Direct Effects of Operating Characteristic Variables on Costs 
It is also important to look at how each of the operating characteristic variables 
have affected costs since the NAFT A announcement. The translog cost function 
results indicate the less-than-truckload variable is highly negative and statistically 
significant. This variable carries a large negative coefficient indicating that firms that 
derived their revenue from less-than-truckload traffic had lower costs. Percentage 
change in costs due to the LTL variable was calculated using equation (12) and the 
results are displayed in Table 9. 
The less-than-truckload (LTL) operating characteristic variable had an overall 
decrease on total costs ranging from 11.228 percent to 14.782, with no noticeably 
difference after the NAFTA announcement. It is important to note that the 
interaction term between time and the L TL variable had a negative impact on costs. 
Also, the interaction term between L TL and outsource has a very significant, negative 
coefficient indicating that L TL firms that outsource help to reduce total costs. These 
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results are somewhat surprising given the fact that L TL hauls are not full truckloads 
and require more consolidation. However, previous research has found the same 
result in regard to effects of the less-than-truckload variable on costs. For example 
Ying ( 1990a) analyzed what effects have contributed to decreased costs following 
deregulation. He found that prior to deregulation, a higher percentage of L TL traffic 
added to costs, but in the years following deregulation, this characteristic helped 
reduce total costs. This could possibly indicate that removing some of the restrictions 
on the trucking industry has made L TL hauls more efficient. Another study done by 
the Upper Great Plains Transportation Institute (1997) found that the L TL sector is 
becoming more consolidated. Many of the larger LTL firms also own some of the 
smaller L TL firms which give them a cost advantage in consolidated loads and having 
resources and facilities for getting consolidation done more efficiently. 
Table 9. Percentage Change in Cost Due to L TL 
LTL• LTL• LTL• LTL• LTL• 
Year LTL Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel 
1999 -0.5361 0.0347 0.1234 -0.4096 0.1381 0.3473 
2000 -0.5361 0.0343 0.1271 -0.4082 0.1383 0.3683 
2001 -0.5361 0.0341 0.1217 -0.4067 0.1382 0.3639 
2002 -0.5361 0.0343 0.122 -0.4094 0.1385 0.3634 
2003 -0.5361 0.0338 0.1217 -0.4093 0.1383 0.3694 
% 
LTL• LTL• LTL• LTL' Change 
Year Rent Caeital LTL·T LTL'N BOR OUT Total C 
1999 -0.0067 0.2117 -0.0171 0 0.0413 -0.0699 -13.3055 
2000 -0.0065 0.2118 -0.0342 0 0.0413 -0.0699 -12.526 
2001 -0.0061 0.2111 -0.0513 0 0.0413 -0.0699 -14.7817 
2002 -0.0061 0.2111 -0 0684 0.0602 0.0413 -0.0699 -11.2281 
2003 -0 0065 0.211 -0.0855 0.0602 0.0413 -0.0699 -12.3308 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year and at a discrete change from O to I for binary variables. 
The negative effect on costs may also be attributed to the fact that the goods are 
being shipped at a faster rate because firms are waiting for goods to come before 
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sending the shipment off, thus more trucks are available and not sitting empty waiting. 
Hubbard (1993) stressed the importance that technological advancements such as on 
board computers and electronic vehicle management systems have had on improving 
network conditions. The improved technology allows better communication between 
the dispatcher and driver and allows the dispatcher to track the driver's exact location 
in order to keep the drivers on the road and loaded more often. The negative impact 
on total costs indicates it is efficient for firms to handle less-than-truckload shipments. 
The translog cost function results show that the outsource characteristic variable 
carries a positive sign, and it is significant at the ten percent level. The coefficient 
indicates that firms that outsource have costs that are about .345 percent higher than 
firms that do not outsource. However, it is important to look at the direct effects of 
outsourcing on costs over time. To accomplish this, equation (12) is used and the 
results are shown in Table I 0. 
Although it was noted that firms that outsource have costs that are about .345 
percent higher than firms that do not outsource, the direct impacts of outsourcing 
indicate that this method actually helps reduce total costs. The outsource operating 
characteristic variable also indicates a negative impact on total costs which is what the 
original hypothesis of this study predicted. This negative impact on costs again 
indicates that outsourcing adds to the efficiency of a trucking firm. The negative 
effects of outsourcing on total costs range from 17. 757 to 20.053 percent. As with the 
L TL variable, there are no noticeable changes in the effect of the outsource variable 
after the NAFTA announcement, possibly indicating that there are other variables 
causing the negative effect or it is the general nature of the firm to do so. The 
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outsourcing variable indicates that a firm hires either equipment or drivers or a 
combination of both to do work for them. It may be more cost effective for a firm to 
rent equipment rather than buying additional equipment or might be less costly to hire 
workers especially if it reduces costs such as health insurance and other fringe 
benefits. 
Table 10. Percentage Change in Cost Due to Outsourcing 
OUT* OUT* OUT* OUT* OUT* 
Year OUT Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel 
1999 0.3447 -0.1118 0.0902 0.0413 -0.8563 0.3568 
2000 0.3447 -0.1104 0.0929 0.0411 -0.8576 0.3784 
2001 0.3447 -0.1098 0.089 0.041 -0.8571 0.3738 
2002 0.3447 -0.1104 0.0892 0.0413 -0.8585 0.3733 
2003 0.3447 
,. 
-0.1089 0.0889 0.0412 -0.8577 0.3795 
% 
OUT* OUT* OUT* OUT* Change 
Year Rent Caeital Out*T OUT*N BOR LTL Total C 
1999 -0.0121 0.0141 0 0031 0 -0.0233 -0.0699 -20.0101 
2000 -0.0117 0.0141 0.0062 0 -0.0233 -0.0699 -17.7571 
2001 -0.0111 0.0141 0.0093 0 -0.0233 -0.0699 -18.0818 
2002 -0.011 0.0141 0.0124 -0.0223 -0.0233 -0.0699 -19.7915 
2003 -0.0117 0.0141 0.0155 -0.0223 -0.0233 -0.0699 -20.0528 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year and at a discrete change from Oto I for binary variables. 
Nickerson and Silverman (2003) indicate that it is often times more desirable for 
a trucking company to hire owner-operators rather than to keep company vehicles 
because those drivers maintain their trucks better and drive more safely. It is more 
efficient for firms to own their own trucks and have their own drivers on staff if they 
carry a large portion of L TL traffic. However, the significant negative interaction 
term between the outsource and L TL variables indicates the opposite. It shows that 
L TL firms that outsource have lower costs. 
The final variable analyzed is the border state characteristic variable. The 
border state variable is not significant, possibly reflecting the lower percentage of 
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firms that are in border states versus those that are not. Again, equation ( 13) was used 
to analyze the variable's effect on costs and results are listed in Table 11. The border 
state characteristic variable is the only variable that has had a positive impact on costs, 
however, it is rather small and has decreased from 1999-2003. Although it is difficult 
to determine where exactly trucking firms do most of their business, the results appear 
to suggest that, holding other factors constant, firms domiciled in US-Mexico border 
states tended to incur higher costs, but these firms incurred smaller costs each year. 
Table 11. Percentage Change in Cost Due to the Border State Variable 
BOR* BOR* BOR* BOR' BOR' 
Year BOR Tons Shiements Miles Labor Diesel 
1999 0.4379 -0.117 -0.0124 -0.0079 -0.2051 0.1049 
2000 0.4379 -0.1155 -0.0128 -0.0079 -0.2054 0.1113 
2001 0.4379 -0.1149 -0.0123 -0.0079 -0.2052 0.1099 
2002 0.4379 -0.1155 -0.0123 -0.0079 -0.2056 0.1098 
2003 0.4379 -0.1139 -0 0123 -0.0079 -0.2054 0.1116 
% 
BOR' BOR* BOR* BOR* Change 
Year Rent caeital BOR*T BOR'N LTL OUT Total C 
1999 -0.0225 -0.1478 -0.01 0 0.0413 -0.0233 3.8877 
2000 -0.0218 -0.1478 -0.02 0 0.0413 -0.0233 3.6672 
2001 -0.0205 -0.1473 -0.03 0 0.0413 -0.0233 2.8092 
2002 -0.0204 -0.1473 -0.04 0.0079 0.0413 -0.0233 2.4905 
2003 -0.0216 -0.1472 -0.05 0.0079 0.0413 -0.0233 1.7247 
Note: The direct effect is evaluated at the sample means of the data for continuous variables for each 
year and at a discrete change from O to I for binary variables. 
Allen Partial Elasticities of Substitution 
The cost share equations were estimated along with the translog cost function 
and those results are listed in Table 13 in the Appendix. Using those estimates, we can 
use equation ( 10) to find the Allen partial elasticities of substitution. It should be 
noted that the elasticities of substitution were computed at their sample means. The 
elasticity values are recorded in Table 12. The asymptotic standard errors were also 
calculated and shown in Table 12 in italics. 
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Table 12. Allen Partial Elasticities of Substitution 
Equip. 
Labor Diesel Rent Caoital 
Labor -1.0625 0.947 0.5532 0.0503 
0.004 -0.0094 -0.0006 -0.0013 
Diesel -2.8119 0.353 0.5853 
0.018 -0.0004 -0.0005 
Equip. 
Rent -1.9459 0.468 
0.0027 -0.0018 
Capital -1.4873 
0.0031 
The own price elasticities have the expected negative sign and the cross price 
elasticities among the price inputs are all positive which indicate that they are 
substitutes. The positive sign of the cross price elasticities indicates that an increase 
in the price of one of these inputs will cause the firm to tum to other less costly inputs. 
The elasticity of substitution between labor and diesel is quite large at 0.947, this 
indicates that if there is a I percent increase in the price of one of these inputs, then 
the firm will increase their demand for the other input by 0.947 percent. The elasticity 
of substitution between labor and capital has a much smaller value. Its value of 0.05 
indicates that as the price of either labor or capital increases by I percent, the demand 
for the other input only increases by 0.05 percent. 
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CHAPTER6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this study was to determine how U.S. trucking firms have 
reacted to the U.S.'s pledge to begin the process of implementing the trucking 
provisions ofNAFTA regarding U.S. and Mexican transborder trucking. In 2001, 
legislation was passed that detailed 22 safety requirements that had to be met before 
allowing trucks from Mexico to drive beyond U.S. commercial zones. The 
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002 included a section 
that allotted funds to carry out these safety requirements. In 2002 the U.S. 
Department of Transportation confirmed that all these requirements were being met 
and the U.S. would be prepared to open the border to Mexican-domiciled commercial 
vehicles by mid-2002. The border was not completely open in 2002 because of 
litigation that continued to delay full implementation. However, the message was 
clear: the process to open the borders had begun. 
As mentioned in the literature review, there was much opposition and concern 
over the process of deregulation because some firms feared the increased competition 
among carriers would have negative impacts. However, nearly all of these studies 
found that deregulation and the subsequent increased competition forced trucking 
firms to become more efficient and innovative to remain competitive. There has been 
similar hype in the trucking industry dealing with the trucking provisions ofNAFTA 
which would allow Mexican trucks to travel anywhere in the U.S. and also allow U.S. 
trucks to travel within Mexico. Much of the opposition was justified by safety 
concerns, but many U.S. firms worried about increased competition from the Mexican 
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firms. Like deregulation, it would be necessary for U.S. firms to become more cost 
effective and efficient in order to remain competitive once the NAFT A trucking 
provisions were fully carried out. 
The original hypothesis of this paper was that trucking firms' total costs would 
decrease as a result of the impending border opening due to N AFT A in the near 
future. The results confirm this hypothesis. It was found that in 2002, the year in 
which is was announced steps would be taken to implement the transborder trucking 
provisions, U.S. trucking firms' costs increased by 6.59 percent in the first year but 
decreased by 4.19 percent in the second year. The increase in the first year could be 
due to adjustment time in the industry, but by the second year firms are taking steps to 
reduce costs before the trucking provisions are fully implemented. 
It was also found that outsourcing and L TL have continued to have negative 
impact and there were no noticeably changes after the NAFT A announcement. The 
results also show that firms domiciled in border states tend to have higher costs than 
other firms. However, it is important to note that these costs have become smaller 
each year since 1999. 
In regards to the input price variables, the diesel and capital variables had a 
negative impact on total costs, however it was noted earlier that the effects of diesel 
price were implausible. The capital price variable had very small negative impacts 
total costs after 2002, which could indicate that investment in new capital is more cost 
effective. The equipment rental and labor input price variables were positive. This 
could be attributed to the fact that outsourcing has become cost savings tool in the 
industry, thus more firms are directing funds to this expenditure. Also, price of labor 
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in general tend to increase from year to year due to salary increases, especially if the 
firm is expanding. 
This research gives us an understanding of how trucking firms are preparing 
themselves for the implementation of the trucking provisions. Data at the time of this 
study only included up to the year 2003, but further studies in the future could use 
subsequent years' trucking data to determine if the trend among trucking firms to 
increase efficiencies to remain competitive still exits. Also, after the NAFT A 
trucking provisions are fully implemented, it would be interesting to see how the full 
implementation has affected trucking firms in both the U.S. and Mexico. The threat 
of implementing the trucking provisions caused firms total costs to decrease in 2003, 
ceteris paribus, so it would be interesting to see if this trend continues in subsequent 
years, 
NAFTA may further help U.S. trucking firms become more efficient. It would 
allow them to travel to their final destination when hauling goods to Mexico. They 
would not have to incur the extra time and costs to unload the goods at the border, 
store them, and reload on a Mexican truck. It would more than likely be more 
efficient to have direct access to their final destination in Mexico. 
Since the legislation in 2002 that would subsequently allow the process of 
implementing the trucking provisions ofNAFTA was announced, the process of 
actual implementation has been somewhat of a sluggish one. There was litigation in 
2002 to bar the implementation ofNAFT A's trucking provisions in which the U.S. 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of. However, in 2004, the U.S. 
Supreme Court unanimously reversed that decision and the U.S. Department of 
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Transportation has been working to develop a NAFTA trucking pilot program. 
Nearly 14 years after NAFT A was signed into effect, a pilot program to allow 
l 00 different Mexican carriers into the U.S. and I 00 U.S. carriers into Mexico is 
being proposed to test out the N AFT A provisions. There is still opposition, but only 
time will tell how the N AFT A provisions will work out for both countries. Research 
has show that past reforms in the trucking industry have forced trucking firms to 
become more efficient benefiting both the business and the consumer. Further 
research may be able to give us the answer if the actual implementation of the 
NAFT A trucking provisions will have the same effect. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 13. Cost Share Eguations 
Chi 
Eguation Observations RMSE R Sguared Sguared 
Labor 3053 0.1064 0.517 3292.87 
Diesel 3053 0.0523 0.3455 1623.63 
Equipment Rental 3053 0.1345 0.6048 4707.21 
Caeital 3053 0.0883 0.5026 2108.13 
Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error t 
Labor 
Tons -0.0012 0.0012 -1.05 
Shipments 0.0219 0.0014 15.28 
Miles -0.0174 0.0022 -7.85 
Labor 0.102 0.0069 14.7 
Diesel -0.0689 0.0076 -8.67 
Equipment Rental -0.0352 0.0013 -2804 
Capital -0.0477 0.0026 -18.28 
Outsource -0.0348 0.005 -6.98 
Border -0.007 0.0061 -1.16 
Less-than-Truckload 0.0625 0.0056 11.21 
NAFTA -0.0049 0.0077 -0.63 
Time -0.0041 0.0028 -1.44 
lnterceet 0.2409 0.0504 4.78 
Diesel 
Tons 0.0005 0.0006 0.91 
Shipments -0.0116 0.0007 -16.24 
Miles 0.0095 0.0011 8.62 
Labor -0.0338 0.0035 -9.79 
Diesel 0.062 0.004 15.67 
Equipment Rental -0.016 0.0006 -25.62 
Capital -0.0124 0.0013 -9.56 
Outsource 0.0033 0.0025 1.33 
Border -0.0069 0.003 -2.29 
Less-than-Truckload -0.0235 0.0028 -8.47 
NAFTA -0.011 0.0038 -2.86 
Time 0.0013 0.0014 0.91 
lnterceet 0.2238 0.0251 8.91 
Eguiement Rental 
Tons -0.0002 0 0015 -0.1 
Shipments -0.0053 0.0018 -2.9 
Miles 0.0033 0.0028 1.19 
Labor -0.0098 0.0088 -1. 11 
Diesel 0.0414 0.01 4.1 
Equipment Rental 0.0776 0.0016 48.69 
Capital -0.0294 0.0033 -8.89 
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Table 13. Continued 
Standard 
Variable Coefficient Error 
Equipment Rental 
Outsource 0.0407 0.0063 6.43 
Less-than-Truckload -0.0201 0.0071 -2.84 
Time 0.0029 0.0036 0.8 
Intercept 0.274 0.064 4.28 
Ca ital 
Tons 0.0011 0.001 1.1 
Shipments -0.0019 0.0012 -1.63 
Miles 0.0006 0.0018 0.3 
Labor -0.0469 0.0058 -8.09 
Diesel -0.0348 0.0066 -5.24 
Equipment Rental -0.0242 0.001 -23.1 
Capital 0.0936 0.0022 42.99 
Outsource -0.0112 0.0042 -2.88 
Border 0.0075 0.0051 1.48 
Less-than-Truckload -0.013 0.0047 -2.79 
NAFTA -0.008 0.0064 -1.25 
Time -0.0019 0.0024 -0.82 
Intercept 0.0523 0.0421 1.24 
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